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Abstract  
 
This paper looks at the concept of reputation from four angles: costbenefit, semiotics, 
quality and complexity. The complexity outlook may include all the other approaches 
in certain conditions but is in comparison wider, deeper, evolutionary and more fickle. 
It can embrace apparently contradictory states that evolve through interaction. The 
focus is on ambiguity, one of the less-known principles of complexity and is argued 
that it can act as a stem cell to build sustainable reputation. Two cases from industry 
are reviewed. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Companies are facing a difficult situation. On the one hand they promulgate learning, 
responsiveness, adaptability and interdependence, on the other, despite meaning 
well, leave a trace of bad reputation by creating redundancies and breaking implicit 
contracts. They promote voluntary labour but reward those who bring success by 
whatever Machiavellian means. We have seen the disappearance of well-known 
firms like UBS, BZW, NatWest Markets, WorldCom, and ENRON leaving the 
stakeholders in limbo. Similarly the drive to core competence clashes with customer 
loyalty. In 1997 Standard Chartered Bank ended relations with 550 corporate clients 
because they no longer provided an appropriate return on capital through foreign 
exchange trading and lending activities (Financial Times, April 7th 1997). Meeting the 
short-term exigencies of profitability and establishing good reputation is hard to 
achieve. If achieved it would make living in complexity easier. What is reputation? It 
is the totality of information purveyed to the stakeholders of a company. The 
information can be used as a weapon against the company, an artificial image to fool 
the customers, or as a gift in the hands of a satisfied customer imparting trust and 
reliability in a chaotic world. According to Fombrun and Rindova (1996), corporate 
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reputation is a collective representation of a firm’s past actions and results that 
describes the firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders. It 
gauges a firm’s relative standing both internally with employees and externally with 
its shareholders, in both its competitive and institutional environment. So reputation is 
path-dependent and acts as an agent of stability. Stability, however, is difficult to 
conceive in a complex world. Reputation is both stable and unstable. There is 
intrinsic instability particularly in the realm of positive feedbacks that requires broader 
outlook and continuous vigilance. This makes reputation a subject of complexity. 
 
In what follows we consider four approaches to reputation: 
 
1 Cost-Benefit approach. 
2 Semiotic approach. 
3 Reputation for quality. 
4 complexity approach with emphasis on feedbacks and ambiguity. 
 
 
2 The cost-benefit approach 
 
The efforts that many proponents of reputation are making to sell it as an asset has a 
cost-benefit connotation. You spend money to build a reputation to get benefit from 
more customers over a long time. All you need is to work out the present value of the 
future benefits to compare with the past investments. This approach is associated 
with but not confined to game theory. Game theories are linked to information about 
the product, the firm, and the behaviour of players in repeated, sequential or 
evolutionary games. 
 
To illustrate reputation in game theory a banking example is provided: Investment 
Banks’ reputation in selling IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) has a variety of aspects one 
of which is clearly a matter of cost-benefit analysis common in game theories: Simply 
put, if the firm hires a reputable bank (at a higher cost) to underwrite its IPOs, the 
IPOs will sell at higher price than if they were underwritten by a less reputable bank, 
which obviously leads to higher profit (Jain, 1994). The Bank, on the other hand, 
could underprice a firm’s stocks for short-term benefit but at the expense of losing 
reputational capital. The case is especially interesting when the firm rejects the 
Bank’s first offer. The immediate acceptance benefits the bank but the repeated 
game benefits the firm (see Mclaughlin, 1996). The cost-benefit slant is quite clear. 
Although repetition is likely to happen here this is not a typically repeated game (For 
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examples of repeated games with cost-benefit orientation see Cripps and Thomas, 
1995; Aoyagi, 1996. For cases of Sequential Games see Hopenhayn and Werner, 
1996; Guth et al., 1997) Evolutionary games are often used in biological and 
educational context and are less common in economics (see Dawid, 1997 for a case 
with minimal information). 
 
The contradictory position of reputation posed at the beginning of this section is 
clear. Bounded rationality on the part of decision-makers is an important element in 
the argument. There is a reputation to protect that enhances potential benefits from 
interdependence, but its value may not exceed the short run gains from sullying it, 
through strategies that treat employees, and perhaps other stakeholders as 
expendable. The firm can shift the costs and risks of competition. The dilemma is 
best portrayed when a company tries to adopt ethical technology. Despite consumer 
preference to ethical technology, and even in the face of Pareto-optimality of such 
technology, ‘reputation’ of competitors and the lack of information on the part of the 
customers, can at least in the short-run hinder the technology (Noe and Rebello, 
1995).  
 
3 Semiotic approach 
 
There is a tradition stretching from Veblen (1958) to the Post-modern view that 
rejects the idea that primary needs govern human activities. It spurns at the concept 
of some irreducible reality, and stresses instead, matters such as over-consumption 
and communicating images of products and organisations. It questions whether what 
we are buying consists of symbols and images or real utilities. Are they produced 
less to satisfy needs, than to signify status? Lack of customer information renders 
this hyper-reality possible. 
 
A clear example is selling ‘lemons’ disguised by the ‘economics of concealment’. 
Sellers use resources to interfere with quality signals. This allows a class of products, 
which can only sell when the customer cannot gauge the quality (Kerton and Bodell, 
1995). Though not as fictitious, the new concept of ‘renting Reputation’ too falls into 
this category of selling the air. Borrowing one’s retailers’ reputation is well explained 
by Chu and Chu (1994). Credit rating agencies (The case of Moody) have been 
known to create unsolicited reputation as a means of ‘crude blackmail’ (The 
Economist, 1996). Fortune, an important reputation-generating agency in recent 
years, admits that their Survey is “a Mixture of art and science, perception and 
reality” (Fortune, 1995). Chajet (1997), comparing products such as Pepsi and Coke, 
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Christler and Ford, or financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney 
argues that they are all increasingly reliant on the same technologies making imagery 
the only means of distinguishing them. It is clear that when there are no obvious 
differences in price, quality, design and features, the purchase decision may 
increasingly be influenced by a positive reputation of the brand and of the 
manufacturer (Christensen and Askegaard, 2001). These authors, conclude that 
corporate image, identity and reputation is not solely based on reality or semiotics but 
on a mixture: We should think of corporate identity and corporate image as social-
historical simulations of organisational realities – simulations whose quality cannot 
simply be judged on the basis of their ‘fit’ with reality (although such judgements are 
made all the time) but also on the basis of their rhetorical power, that is, their 
credibility and persuasiveness in a world saturated with signs. 
 
4 Reputation for quality 
 
The literature on reputation often leans on quality. Reputation is for imparting quality 
and providing improvements based on customer feedback. The first two out of eight 
components of Fortune’s criteria for reputation consist of “management of quality and 
quality of products and services”. The first volume of Corporate Reputation Review 
had many articles with a quality dimension e.g. Karen de Segundo’s (1997) 
contribution. Like De Segundo, many of the contributors in this volume also 
emphasised consistent quality as against financial performance. Of the electronic 
databases Econlit focused on reputation in the game-theoretic sense, whereas ASAP 
and ABI/Inform show reputation more or less in a quality context. Reputation for 
quality is a dynamic asset for an organisation. It removes many unknown variables 
for the stakeholder. Reputation for quality is often established through relationship 
with the stakeholders but there are also several national, European, and international 
standards to formalise reputation for quality. Such a reputation is regarded as a main 
source of higher productivity and global competitiveness (Greenbaum, 1993; Roehm 
et al., 1995). 
 
4.1 The supplier 
 
Quality systems promote long-term supplier relationship in each input field. This 
relationship flourishes by developing loyalty and trust, training suppliers and 
subcontractors, choosing supplier on quality not price alone, developing 
communications, and encouraging visits by suppliers to improve cooperation. 
Corporate reputation for quality can give the supplier certainty and confidence to plan 
its production and delivery, gain technical assistance with training etc. In return, the 
 5 
supplier is obliged to produce in response to certain specifications, and be constantly 
prepared to have its procedures audited. However, if both organisations have the 
same quality systems the feedback loops will be shorter and more efficient. 
Nonetheless, single sourcing does not easily appeal to ‘common sense’. Many find 
multiple sourcing more profitable (Richardson and Roumasset, 1995). Defenders of 
single suppler system of course argue for the long-term benefits. 
 
4.2 The customer 
 
Quality organisations have reputation for staying close to the customer, ensuring 
customer satisfaction, relying on customer feedback, improving company image, 
carrying out research for marketing innovation and establishing good communication. 
Reputable organisations have a customer focus both in producing and marketing 
their goods. Working out customer needs and expectations is a difficult subject in 
marketing, but quality organisations attempt to exceed these expectations and by 
doing so establish a competitive edge (Jeffords and Thibadoux, 1993). On-time 
delivery is also a great source of reputation for quality and benefits from parallel 
movements such as Just-In-Time and so on. Delivery is often outsourced; there are 
companies with reputation for on-time delivery such as ADL who take up the task. It 
is believed that ADL’s reputation is tied with quality, in particular with people 
empowerment (Hamer Group, 2001).  
 
4.3 The employees 
 
The chain from suppliers to customers passes through the organisation itself. A 
better relationship within the organisation especially between managers and the 
employee is the most important source of reputation. One of the main vehicles of 
generating good relationship and short feedbacks is the quality circle. Groups of 
people especially at lower levels form around what is called the micro-processes to 
sort out problems locally. Usually a member of the circle is represented in cross-
departmental duties to provide feedback on the complex issue of multifunctional work 
to the council of strategic management (Bovet, 1994). For such complex tasks to 
succeed people empowerment (prominent in European Quality Award) must precede 
work on processes (Townsend and Gebhardt, 1994). 
 
In order for the quality chain to work there are many principles at work that 
emphasise continuous improvement, organisational learning, interdependence, 
sense of belonging, measurement of performance, breaking down barriers, driving 
out fears and so on. On the face of it, establishing reputation for quality, with all the 
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high sounding principles that it involves, could help increase customer certainty and 
satisfaction, productivity and competitive advantage, and above all humanise the 
work environment and, for that matter, the environment in general. However, doubts 
are beginning to appear as to the authenticity of all these claims. Wilkinson and 
Willmot (1995) provide a rare critical view of quality management where the internal 
customer concept is represented as commoditisation of work force, and 
empowerment is nothing but making an individual perform several duties. More 
experience and more scholarly works of this nature are needed to see whether there 
is any reality behind the image. 
 
5 Introducing complexity 
 
These approaches are not reconcilable in the sense that one may be reduced to the 
other, but they can be encompassed within a framework of complexity. Organisations 
are treated here as complex systems that embrace apparently contradictory 
possibilities of order and disorder, co-operation and non-co-operation, trust and 
suspicion, rational and irrational behaviour. In such systems, the distinction between 
the real and the imaginary is not nearly as clear-cut as in a deterministic regime. 
Complexity is a way of thinking about the collective behaviour of interacting 
elements; atoms, molecules, neurons, bits within a computer (Kauffman, 1993). 
 
As with other complex systems, organisations are macroscopic collections of 
activities that are capable of evolution through time. Through integration, synergy or 
complementarity between activities, the whole is different from the sum of the parts. 
Their current capabilities are partly determined by their history (path-dependence), 
which is irreversible. They express non-linearities in the sense that at times small 
changes at one level can cause big changes in others. The first approach leads 
naturally to an interpretation of reputation as a source of competitive advantage that 
can be manipulated. Reputation triggers anticipations of costs and benefits, which in 
turn become levers on behaviour. If, as envisaged in the second approach, 
organisations resemble theme parks, encountered by a multiplicity of stakeholders 
ranging from customers, to employees, rivals, stockholders and partners, reputation 
may be constructed as an image, a perception, part of a many layered reality, in 
which costs and benefits too are part of an interface between the imaginary and the 
real. Here the concept even of the bounded rational actor dissolves. Success itself 
becomes multi faceted, competitive advantage an impression that can be 
constructed. The quality approach is more realistic but does not allow for uncertainty 
and ambiguity. The view taken in the paper is that neither approach can be held to 
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the exclusion of the others, and that an appropriate position allows for ambiguity, and 
is inclusive. 
 
Consider the dilemma in financial services. The environment has been transformed. 
Since the 1980’s first second and third order derivatives have emerged, alongside 
new mathematical tools that give greater understanding of the nature of risk and the 
way it is priced, together with advances in electronic trading. Derivatives have 
stretched from currency and interest instruments, to contingency products offering 
returns on markets other than those on which the trade was originally made. 
Corporations show sensitivity to individual behaviour and interpretation; a rogue 
trader can tip them into bankruptcy; a different measure of risk may transform profit 
into loss (See Slack 2006 on Nick Leeson as a rouge trader who falsified the 
accounts). 
 
The complexity and size of the global financial market has increased, and there are a 
myriad of niches, segments and areas in which to compete; the global bank 
hypermarket, the specialist boutique, investment and trading activities, the provision 
of information, transactions and regulatory infrastructure. The search for competitive 
advantage necessarily involves a break with the past, putting at risk, reputation, 
which is the root of the firms capabilities; intellectual assets, information sharing, 
understanding of needs, cross-selling, innovation. Adding a further dimension of 
complexity is the question of whether foundations are set firmly in intrinsic values 
calculated by analysis of present conditions and future prospects, or if instead, mobs 
of traders and investors weave their hopes, fears, and fantasies into castles in the 
air. 
 
6 Reputation and complexity 
 
The concept of feedbacks in complexity is essential to this section. There are two 
types of feedbacks: negative (self-balancing) and positive (self-reinforcing or 
amplifying). Negative feedback leads to stability of any system, and steady state in 
open systems. Positive feedback reinforces or amplifies a trend or behaviour in the 
same direction leading to instability and bifurcation to new states of existence (Capra, 
1997). In systems view, both negative and positive feedback is important. 
 
The search for competitive advantage or rent is presented in this paper as a naïve 
negative feedback system. The business environment contains opportunities and 
constraints that together with organisational capabilities in terms of assets, 
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architecture, reputation, and innovation determine the firm’s capacity to earn rent. 
Creation of competitive advantage triggers negative feedback, attracting rivals, as 
rent earning firms are compelled to protect existing sources of competitive 
advantage, or search for new ones. Capabilities are also affected by tradeoffs 
between stakeholder interests decided on by the firm since they affect for example 
incentives to staff, attractiveness to customers, and scope for entry by rivals. The 
image of the firm is affected by its advertising, promotion, and selling costs that 
differentiate it from rivals. 
 
There are more complex feedbacks. Reputation is essentially path dependent. It is 
formed historically from a procession of events. Game theory models stress the 
importance of reputation in repeated games with limited information (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1993). Reputation features in a number of 
feedbacks. They include: responses to expectations about the business environment; 
customer responses to the distribution of payoffs by the firm which is expressed by 
the price and quality of products and services; co-operative decision making which 
determines realisation of payoffs and willingness to share information and learn; the 
reputation of reactions to the entry of rivals into the firms markets. 
 
Put in another way, reputation reflects sequence in which choices are made and so it 
determines solution or course of action taken by stakeholders. Systems temporarily 
in equilibrium may be unstable. Small events and changes in behaviour can 
determine outcomes. So the state of the system at any one point in time determines 
not the next sequence of actions, but their probability. The presence of increasing 
returns and lock-in effects complicates our ability to describe a firm’s search for 
competitive advantage. Increasing returns or non-convexity can imply a multiplicity of 
equilibria, or instability in the sense that deviations from a particular state lead to 
positive feedbacks and amplifications of a particular state. A particular technology 
may become dominant through lock-in effects whether it is the most efficient or not; 
in the case of VHS and Betamax, the lead gained by the former, enhanced its 
competitive position, and so further increased its market share. In contrast to the 
smooth negative feedbacks, disequilibrium, instability, and inefficiency may be the 
result of the processes mentioned above. Attractors rather than equilibria are 
appropriate terms. A point attractor corresponds to a single configuration, or vector of 
prices and quantities associated with the activities of the organisation: Intersection of 
supply and demand at equilibrium. A periodic attractor corresponds to regular or 
irregular variations around an average value. The firm is faced with continuous 
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competition and have to renew competitive advantage by defining new strategies 
with respect to its activities, very much like supermarkets jostling for position; or the 
average may converge to, or vary around, some negative rental in the long run, 
meaning that organisations are transient (For more complex attractors see Stacy, 
1995). The formation of reputation is an outcome of the complex interactive 
processes. They include the history of the environment, decisions in response to 
competition for rents, the landscape of potential payoffs in an organisation, its 
capacity to learn, the impact of the distribution of payoffs between stakeholders and 
its resultant image, real or imaginary. 
 
6.1 Reputation feedbacks 
 
Cost benefit approaches to reputation are reflected in game theory and other models 
in industrial organisation. Where customers are able to acquire information about a 
product at not too high a cost, it is asserted that reputation is unlikely to be a source 
of competitive advantage. Attributes of some products, especially the professional 
services of doctors, lawyers and financial advisers, can only be evaluated imperfectly 
even after repeated purchasing (Douglas, 1987). These are credence products that 
rely on reputation. 
 
The influence of reputation goes beyond customer demand and product reliability. 
For example, in the chain store game (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), it is extended to 
the entry of competitors through the firm’s record of reactions to would be 
competitors through limit, or predatory pricing. In a prisoner’s dilemma game played 
infinitely, co-operative equilibrium can be founded on a reputation for behaving co-
operatively and punishing deviations. In a finite prisoner’s dilemma games, Co-
operation may happen because players attach a small probability to collaboration by 
others, based on perceptions of altruism, learning, or bounded rationality (Kreps and 
Wilson, 1982; see also Kreps, 1990, regarding reputation for non-exploitation). 
 
Supply chain feedbacks occur both within the firm and between the firm and its 
partners (Reyniers and Tapiero, 1995). The supplier establishes reputation for quality 
and the producer forgoes the inspection stipulated in the design contract. Customer 
feedbacks are usually distinguished from other feedbacks in the value chain since 
they relate specifically to demand. Bournico, et al. (1996) consider the increasing 
complexity of computer systems where customer feedback through system service 
support helps with quantifying the trade-off between cost and quality. Feedbacks 
from rivals reflect reputation based on past responses to entrants by rivals. 
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Against all this vast array of possibilities which deny our ability to control, there are 
two stabilising factors. Self-organisation, the ‘invisible hand’ of complexity theories, 
churns out patterns that may direct us to successful outcomes. The second is the 
role of reputation in restricting the domain of outcomes. 
 
6.2 Reputation as a control parameter 
 
Firms may be irrational or short term. They may be boundedly rational, but discount 
rates may be so high that the benefits of short-term behaviour outweigh longer-term 
considerations. With full information, markets may impose cost and price reductions, 
so the liability of greater product and employment risk is shifted to customers and 
employees. Redundancy pay might compensate the employee for the severed 
contract in a Coasian bargaining scenario (Coase, 1937). If customers cannot gauge 
quality, a lemons market may emerge in which suppliers are induced to sell low 
quality rather than high quality products, which means lack of information and market 
failure (Akerlof, 1970). In others, the landscape in which firms operate may be so 
dynamic and unpredictable that all games are effectively one-off. Then reputation, or 
the possibility of long term gain counts for little, and any perceived advantages from 
non-co-operative behaviour in the form of breaking implicit or explicit contracts or 
even from outright exploitation are grasped. 
 
Complexity introduces another dimension by recognising ambiguity. Firms may have 
mixed motives. Strategy is formed through the interaction of stakeholder groups and 
so is subject to oscillation as power between them shifts. Supply and demand are 
interdependent and failures occur in the attempts to balance cost reductions that 
increase or decrease profit through their interaction upon demand. Again what we 
may be observing is strategy based on more or less random configurations. The 
previous section focused upon the feedback aspects of reputation and this one sets 
out a foundation, for management’s role in using reputation in limiting the number of 
potential outcomes. Organisations pass through only a limited number of the all 
states that are possible given the interacting variables affecting their behaviour. The 
path they follow through the universe of possibilities is restricted by tuning 
parameters that are akin to Holland’s (1995) conception of standard operating 
procedures. Here the particular concern is reputation as a parameter determining co-
operative variables. On-line business is particularly keen on fixing or standardisation 
of this variable to reduce uncertainty. Trust and reputation meet to create a 
satisfactory transaction. They don’t meet at a point; they gravitate to a relatively 
 11 
stable position. Grabner-Kraeuter (2002), views reputation and trust as coexisting 
mechanisms for reducing the uncertainty and complexity of transactions and 
relationships in electronic markets. In an agency-theoretical perspective reputation is 
the third instrument a business firm can use to encourage trustworthiness in 
transactions. Opportunistic actions within a certain market might yield short-term 
benefits, but there would be a long-term cost in the sense of a lack of trust that might 
inhibit future acquisitions of cost-reducing and/or quality-enhancing assets. 
 
Reputation is the result of trustworthy behaviour and plays an important part in 
determining the willingness of others to enter into an exchange with a given actor 
(Hosmer, 1995). Reputation serves both to reduce uncertainty, guide the decision of 
whether to trust the other party, and also as a potential source of sanctions. The 
higher the reputation, the greater the loss in case of unfavourable behaviour and the 
more certain the trustor can be that the company will not act opportunistically. In 
electronic markets there are new challenges to managing reputation policies, mostly 
because of the ease of changing identities and the extremely low costs of collecting 
and distributing information online (Kollock, 1999). In e-business, where trust is most 
needed, reputation is actually being used as a control variable (Katkar and Lucking-
Reiley, 2000).  
 
7 Ambiguity 
 
Uncertainty and ambiguity are part of complexity and cannot be eradicated but can 
be utilised often to good ends which can enhance reputation. Undesirable outcomes 
are also possible. Derrida stresses the in-eradicable equivocality in human 
communication. He argues that while human beings desire to reduce ambiguity, 
ambiguity and indeterminacy, as drivers of processes of organising, may never be 
completely removed (Cooper, 1989). Similar positions have been articulated by 
Alvesson (1993), and March and Olsen (1976), who have stressed the centrality of 
ambiguity in organisational analysis. 
 
According to some of the earliest definitions, ambiguity represents an inability to 
interpret or make sense of something (Machlup, 1980) either because a message 
does not activate a knowledge frame or the interpretive knowledge does not exist. 
Martin (1992) associates ambiguity with “lack of clarity, high complexity, or a 
paradox”. March (1994) takes a similar position regarding ambiguous situations, 
intentions, identities and outcomes. He says “ambiguity refers to a lack of clarity or 
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consistency in reality, causality, or intentionality”. March does not see ambiguity as a 
problem to avoid. He sees it as a tool which can be utilised but not destroyed. It stays 
as part of complexity. March is well aware of the sustainability of ambiguity as a 
managerial tool: “It is common to keep or increase ambiguity to gain support from 
participants” …… “Policy ambiguity encourages administrative autonomy, which in 
turn encourage more policy ambiguity” (March, 1989). In contrast to the assumptions 
underlying uncertainty, regarding ambiguous situations or events are often neither 
clear nor understandable (McCaskey,1982). Alverson (1993) isolates uncertainty with 
clarity: With uncertainty we gather and share more information to achieve some 
certainty. 
 
The focus on uncertainty and information sharing has led to team theory. Although it 
is a step nearer to ambiguity but in essence it remains a statistical decision theory 
dealing with teams rather than individual payoffs. Gibbons (2003), has distinguished 
team theory from ambiguity: Whereas in team theory and decentralised information 
processing, the available information is always well defined, and the individual 
objectives are always clear, in real organisations decision makers are frequently 
unsure both about what they don’t know, and even what they are supposed to be 
doing. Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) have also distanced themselves from team 
theory. Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) highlight the problems of communications in a 
way that departs from information efficiency and approaches ambiguity especially 
when they contrast soft and hard information. In hard information we are dealing with 
efficiency but soft information involves the people behind the message, and more 
importantly their interest: Simply put, it takes two to communicate. This involves “the 
commonality of the two parties’ background, language, or references”. As an 
example of vested interest getting in the way of communication consider the Miners’ 
strike in the UK narrated by De Burgundy (1995): The government thought they were 
talking economics and the miners talked about Mrs Thatcher’s secret plan to wipe out 
deep coal mining. Miners also insisted on social responsibility which did not make 
economic sense for the other side. Such clashes also happen in management as the 
Intel case below shows. 
 
With management in mind, Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) distinguish between 
executive and supervisory decision making. While the former concerns itself with 
effectiveness of communication the latter focuses on helping the receiver of 
information to “assess the merits of alternative choices”. Interpretation of the 
message is widely promoted both as the ingredient of ambiguity and for resolving it. 
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For Zack (2004), resolving ambiguity includes imposed interpretation which seems to 
take the better of complexity, for others, such as Schank (1987) and Weick (1979), 
however, complexity stays and the focus is on autonomous interpretation. Weick and 
Sutcliffe (2001) goes as far as claiming that people make their own reality. Jonker 
and Cramer (2005) use Weick’s ‘sensemaking’ to explain how companies they have 
studied in Holland can build corporate Social Responsibility from ambiguity: 
“According to Weick, a process of sense-making starts off through mutual interaction. 
People constantly react to each other and by doing so they play an active and 
defining role in the production of their own reality. As a result of interaction, people 
start to see their joint environment in a similar way. They are going to share their 
beliefs and consequently they collectivise meaning”. This is how ambiguity creates a 
culture that can in turn contribute to reputation. We shall look at culture in more detail 
later. Meanwhile it is useful to examine two examples (abridged) from disaster 
recovery and innovation as these are the areas frequently visited by ambiguity. 
 
“In 1997, the Toyota group suffered what seemed like a catastrophic failure in their 
production system, when a key factory burned to the ground overnight. On account of 
their much vaunted just-in-time inventory system, the company maintained only three 
days of stock, while a new factory would take six months to build. In the meantime 
Toyota’s production of over15,000 cars a day would grind to a halt. This was the kind 
of disaster with the potential to wreck not just the company itself, but the entire 
Japanese automotive industry. Clearly then, both Toyota, along with the more than 
200 other companies that are members of the extended Toyota group, had ample 
incentives to find a solution. The real question was: How does one rapidly regenerate 
large quantities of a complex component, in several different varieties, without any 
specialised tools, gauges, and manufacturing lines with barely any relevant 
experience (the company that made them was highly specialised); with very little 
direction either from Toyota or Aisin Seiki (the factory owner); and without 
compromising any of their other production tasks? Nobody had a clear solution 
[ambiguity]. … Nevertheless, they succeeded, but not in the way one might have 
expected. As documented by Toshihiro Nishiguchi and Alexander Beaudet, rather 
than relying on the guidance and coordination of an inspired leader, the response 
was a bewildering display of truly decentralised problem solving: more than 200 
companies reorganised themselves and each other to develop at least six entirely 
different production processes, each using different tools, different engineering 
approaches, and different organisational arrangements. Virtually every aspect of the 
recovery effort had to be designed and executed on the fly, with engineers and 
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managers sharing their successes and failures alike across departmental 
boundaries, and even between firms that in normal times would be direct 
competitors. Within three days, production of the critical valves was in full swing, and 
within a week, production levels had regained their pre-disaster levels. Had either 
Toyota or Aisin attempted to centralise the recovery effort, it seems clear that it could 
not have succeeded – even as it was, Aisin was completely overwhelmed. The key to 
the recovery was that both design and production could proceed simultaneously and 
in a highly coordinated manner across many firms, without any one manager or even 
any single firm having to do the coordinating. Yet the kind of distributed coordination 
this activity required had not been consciously designed, nor could it have been 
developed in the drastically short time frame required. The surprise was that the 
capability appeared to have been there all along, lying dormant in the network of 
informal relations that had been built up between the firms via years of cooperation 
and information sharing over routine problem solving tasks. No one could have 
predicted precisely how this network would come in handy for this particular problem, 
but they didn’t need to - by giving individual workers fast access to information and 
resources as they discovered their need for them, the network did its job anyway” 
(Watts, 2006). 
 
The case of Intel relates to ambiguity by allowing for autonomy. The following is 
gleaned from Burgelman’s (2004) collection including one co-authored with the then 
CEO of Intel Andy Grove. Unlike many approaches to ambiguity that consider it as a 
case of misunderstanding Intel’s shift from DRAM (memory business) to a leading 
microprocessor company is a case of the management issuing strategy guidelines 
but leaving a leeway for the people to deal with it in their own way. The ambiguity is 
clear from Les Vadasz’s reminiscences of the times when he was a top manager in 
Intel: “we had a sense about the technology and the business which led to a series of 
correct decisions”. Not only were the top managers unclear about precise objectives 
the people at the shop level too were insufficiently ‘task-mature’: “Managers started 
gaming with the system. One key symptom was that the new ideas were often co-
opted by groups and moulded to fit immediate needs rather than developed as 
originally planned”. This approach had almost become a culture: When the company 
chiefs began to issue more clear guidelines “some managers complained that their 
‘sandbox’ was too well-defined”. In 1989 the Intel Chairman Gordon Moor argued for 
well-defined strategies aiming to ‘suppress’ the autonomy but he failed to do so. An 
initiative at lower level emerged to dominate Intel’s business. Les Kohn an astute 
technologist who was employed in 1982 was determined to test the strategic 
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boundaries by pushing for RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computing). He faced 
strong opposition from the establishment. He thought of doing it ‘under the table’ but 
it was too costly. Eventually he tried to disguise his project as a ‘co-processor’ 
meaning that it only complemented the current design. When he managed to 
convince the top managers that there was a market for the RISC chip the strategy 
was amended to incorporate the chip. This is what turned Intel to what it is now – a 
giant microprocessor business. 
 
This case shows that as the process of innovation unfolds and more information 
becomes available, top management is able to evaluate the adaptive potential of the 
new activities for the organisation. CEO Andy Grove makes the case for ambiguity 
when he outlines the new strategy of moving from DRAM to RISC: 
 
“...We had become a non-factor in DRAM…. The DRAM business just passed 
us by. Yet in 1985 many people were still holding to the self-evident truth that 
Intel was a memory company. One of the toughest challenges is to make 
people see that these selfevident truths are no longer true”.  
 
After explaining the technicalities of the change Grove concludes that:  
 
“You need to be able to be ambiguous in some circumstances. You dance 
around it a bit until a wider and wider group of people in the company become 
clear about it. That is why continued argument is important. Intel is a very 
open system. No one is ever told to shut up, but you are asked to come up 
with better ideas. People are allowed to be persistent”  
          (Burgelman, 2004). 
 
Self-organised activities of this kind migrate into a culture especially when 
successful. Schein (1992) a prominent writer on culture says that culture is very 
helpful in understanding contradictions and ambiguity. Schein has influenced many 
who associate ambiguity with culture. Martin (1992) for instance, suggests a 
‘fragmentation’ perspective that has a “focus on ambiguity as the essence of 
organisational culture.” Hendrikse (1993), claims that even environments with low 
goal incongruence and low performance ambiguity require a culture which 
coordinates the actions of boundedly rational agents. Culture plays a similar role at 
the firm level in Weick (1995). His analysis is built on the assumption that “the variety 
that exists in the system to be managed exceeds the variety in the people who must 
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regulate it”, i.e. the cognitive capabilities of employees are insufficient to grasp the 
complexity of the world (bounded rationality) and therefore they don’t know the right 
decision for the organisation when faced with unforeseen contingencies. Culture 
might resolve this because it “creates a homogeneous set of assumptions and 
decision premises which, when they are invoked on a local and decentralised basis 
preserve coordination and centralisation”. Thus culture can render ambiguities 
meaningful but at the same time divest them of meaning by standardising them. 
 
Crémer (1993) and Lazear (1995) also take lead from Schein. Crémer (1993) defines 
culture, following Schein (1985), as a stock of shared knowledge and argues that it 
improves the efficiency of information processing. Most of the paper discusses 
communication, but it also presents an interesting team-theoretic model that shows 
how shared information may improve coordination. There are three shortcomings: 
First, Cr´emer seems to focus on factual information that is relatively easy to share 
(at some fixed cost). Second, the model does not really deal with the genesis of 
culture, but focuses on its effects. Some of Cr´emer’s comments suggest that the 
content of culture is a simple managerial choice. Third, except for the initial cost of 
sharing the information, more culture is always better in his model. As a 
consequence, the model has no natural explanation why culture might be 
dysfunctional or why firms in the same industry with similar history might end up 
having very different cultures. 
 
Lazear (1995) also defines culture as “shared beliefs, values and technology” and 
considers a ‘genetic’ evolutionary model of corporate culture, built on the assumption 
that culture is contagious but that management can influence the reproduction rates 
of the different ‘genes.’ It provides an alternative perspective how culture might 
evolve. Like most works in the area it implicitly assumes that homogeneity is 
valuable. As a consequence the model has no natural explanation for dysfunctional 
cultures or for the fact that structurally similar firms might end up with very different 
cultures. Hence negative reputation.  
 
Hermalin (2001) sees culture as a reputation for dealing in a specific way with 
unforeseen contingencies. Hermalin refer to ‘trust’ in a repeated game as the way to 
think about this, but then with the future stage-games being unforeseen. Reputation 
for dealing with the unforeseen may sound like a sand castle, but so is the reputation 
of financial institutions hedging for future. They use the path-dependency of the 
underlying stock to mitigate the risk. Maybe the path dependency of their own 
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performance in dealing with ambiguity of financial instruments and the behaviour of 
their ‘traders’ can create a culture and reputation for reliability. 
 
8 Conclusions 
 
Examining reputation from different perspectives, it was argued that a complexity 
view of reputation is more inclusive. We tried to establish that there are limitations to 
the other outlooks but did not exclude them as irrelevant. Cost-benefit analysis is 
often criticised for narrow-mindedness, but if it is sufficiently widened to embrace 
stakeholders it could be successfully included in complexity. Similarly, reputation for 
quality cannot be dismissed by complexity/ evolutionary outlook. Commonly, 
companies are known either for price or quality. For complexity view companies can 
be both. At the same time they can be neither; they can simply appear to be both. In 
an evolutionary process creatures do change colour not to fool but to attract. 
Semiotics based on reality may fall in the latter category. Buying into quality 
standards and wearing all those badges such as “investors in people” for mature 
companies can simply be a cheap imitation of the peacock’s changing of colours in 
mating season. No harm in trying to attract: Such an imitation looks like semiotics 
married to quality. The danger is when they try to hold on to the puffed up feathers 
and temporary colours. It is only then that we find semiotics detached from the 
complexity/evolutionary framework. It is only then we encounter ENRONs and 
World.coms. There is a strong tradition in complexity thinking to appreciate semiotics 
as part of the rich pattern of life. Quality is also embraced in evolutionary complexity 
tradition. We recommend Sidney Winter’s (1994) article on the meeting of quality and 
evolutionary outlook. In a complexity view reputation is regarded circumstantially. In a 
worldview that accepts interdependence, path-dependence (history), change, and 
ambiguity, one cannot afford to see reputation solely in a semi-religious fashion 
common to the shallow versions of quality outlook. Reputation depends on the 
negative, but also on the more dangerous positive feedbacks. It is fickle, it is subject 
to ambiguity. We focused on the ‘nice’ aspects of ambiguity in two case studies 
where ambiguity feeding on ‘slack’ allows lower ranking employees to indulge in 
innovation. It is also possible that things can go wrong. The Red Queen effect is 
always there in particular when innovation is accompanied by fierce individualistic 
competition rather than cooperation. We gave a particular weight to ambiguity in a 
complexity context to imply such possibilities. Using ambiguity as a stem cell to build 
reputation is a difficult craft but is more sustainable. Sustainable reputation requires 
‘mindful’ management where failure is part of the rich pattern of life. We recommend 
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the five principles of mindfulness proposed by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) that grants 
failure pride of the place: These are: 
 
1 preoccupation with failure 
2 reluctance to simplify interpretations 
3 sensitivity to operations 
4 commitment to resilience 
5 deference to expertise. 
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